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ABSTRACT 
 
Based on a sample of 290 large U.S. corporations, we find that dual positioning on both CEO and 
board chairperson positions at the corporate top leads to reduced firm risk-taking propensity, 
serving managerial risk minimization preferences. We also find empirical evidence that 
traditionally emphasized control mechanisms of board independence and managerial ownership 
are ineffective in controlling managerial behavior when CEO duality leadership exists. 
Additionally, the power balance obtained from concentrated shareholder ownership in the firm has 
significant impact on controlling managerial behavior regarding firm risk taking. The findings of 
this research contribute to reducing the controversy surrounding CEO duality leadership by 
furnishing empirical evidence of how CEO duality leadership in corporate governance structure 
affects managerial behavior in corporate strategic management. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
EO duality occurs when the same person occupies both the CEO and board chairperson positions in a 
corporation (Rechner & Dalton, 1991). On the other hand, if different individuals serve in these two 
pivotal positions, the firm can be said to adopt a separate leadership structure. The fundamental 
question surrounding CEO duality leadership is whether the chairperson‘s position should be filled by the CEO or by 
a different person (Daily & Dalton, 1997). A central concern has been whether one person‘s positioning at the 
corporate pivotal positions of CEO and board chairperson weakens corporate governance effectiveness, leading to 
managerial opportunism and resulting in reduced firm performance (Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997; Finkelstein & 
D‘Aveni, 1994). From the agency theory perspective, having one individual in charge of both management 
implementation and control is not consistent with the concept of checks and balance. However, from an organization 
theory perspective, CEO duality may enhance organizational efficiency in corporate leadership (Boyd, 1995).  
 
Most theoretical arguments against the practice of CEO duality leadership have centered on the issue of 
power concentration on dual CEO (Brockmann, Hoffman, Dawley, & Fornaciari, 2004; Daily & Dalton, 1997). 
Duality has been described as a concentration of power on the dual CEO, enabling dual CEOs to dominate the 
board, reducing board effectiveness in monitoring and controlling the management (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Westphal 
& Zajac, 1998). CEO duality leadership implies a heightened formal authority and greater informal power for the 
one individual who occupies two positions, both as CEO in management implementation and board chairperson in 
management control (Harrison, Torres, & Kukalis, 1988). In addition to formal hierarchical power on the executive 
team derived from the position as CEO, by virtue of their position as chairperson of the board, dual CEOs can exert 
substantial influence on the board by controlling the information flows to the board and through intervening in the 
process of new director appointment (Dayton, 1984).  
 
Researches in the past on organizational outcomes associated with CEO duality have generally focused on 
the performance dimension, and have provided divergent empirical prescriptions regarding the performance 
consequences of CEO duality leadership (Boyd, 1995; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; see Table 1 below 
for summary). While some studies find a negative effect of duality leadership on corporate performance (e.g., Daily 
C 
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& Dalton, 1994; Rechner & Dalton, 1991), others have observed positive effects (e.g., Donaldson & Davis, 1991), 
and still others have found no significant relationship between CEO duality and firm performance (Chaganti, 
Mahajan, & Sharma, 1985; Brickley et al., 1997). Thus, the debate on CEO duality leadership is characterized by 
considerable divergence of opinion and little consensus (e.g., Dalton et al., 1998; Brickley et al., 1997; Finkelstein & 
D‘Aveni, 1994). 
 
 
Table 1 
Prior Empirical Research on CEO Duality–Firm Performance Relationship 
 
Empirical 
Findings 
Author(s) Sample and Methods Performance Measures 
Positive Impact 
on Performance 
Donaldson & Davis 
(1991) 
321 U.S. corporations from Standard 
& Poor‘s register,  
1988, survey method 
ROE, Stockholder return (capital gains 
from appreciation of stock price) 
Boyd (1995) 
 
 
 
192 firms from 12 industries, 1980, 
data from Moody‘s manual and 
Compact Disclosure 
Sales growth, ROI, 
Industry market share 
* Contingent on munificent and 
complex environments 
Brickley, Coles, & 
Jarrell (1997) 
661 firms from Forbes survey, 1988 ROA, Stockholder return 
Negative 
Impact on 
Performance  
Rechner & Dalton 
(1991) 
141 firms from Fortune 500,  
Longitudinal study (1978-1983) 
ROE, ROI, Profit 
 
Pi & Timme (1993) 112 banks, Longitudinal study (1987-
1990) 
ROA, Cost efficiency 
Daily & Dalton (1994) Paired sample of 57 firms from the 
period of 1972-1982 
Bankruptcy vs. Non-bankruptcy 
No Systematic 
Relationship 
Rechner & Dalton 
(1989) 
141 firms from Fortune 500, 
Longitudinal study (1978 – 1983) 
Stockholder return 
Berg & Smith (1978) 200 firms from Fortune 200 
companies in 1976 
ROE, ROI, Stockholder return 
Chaganti, Mahajan, & 
Sharma (1985) 
Paired sample of 21 firms,  
retailing industry, Longitudinal study 
(1971-1976) 
Bankruptcy vs. Non-bankruptcy  
Boyd (1995) 
 
 
192 firms from 12 industries, 
1980, data from Moody‘s manual and 
Compact Disclosure 
Sales growth, ROI, 
Industry market share 
* Contingent on dynamic environments 
Baliga, Moyer, & Rao 
(1996) 
111 firms from Fortune 500, 1990, 
Announcement effects of changes in 
CEO duality 
ROE, ROA, Operating cash flow/total 
assets, Stockholder return (MVA) 
Daily (1995) 72 firms filling for  bankruptcy 
protection during the period of 1980-
1986 
Bankruptcy Reorganization 
 
 
Unfortunately, to date, extant literature has paid little attention to investigating the implications of CEO 
duality leadership on strategic management such as firm risk-taking behavior. To our best knowledge of the 
literature focusing on CEO duality, no research has shed light on managerial risk-taking propensity which is an 
important aspect in strategic management. Moreover, little is known on whether the presence of duality at the 
corporate top contributes to agent opportunism or promotes stewardship pro-organizational behavior in firm 
strategic management practices. If managerial utility functions are well-served by duality leadership, we can 
reasonably expect organizations led by CEO duality to exhibit lower risk preferences than those where there is a 
separation of the two pivotal positions at the corporate top. Thus, we empirically investigate how CEO duality 
structure affects firm risk-taking propensity in strategic management using a data sample of 290 companies listed in 
the Fortune 1000. For a more comprehensive understanding about the structural context of CEO duality leadership, 
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we also examine the role of control mechanisms (board independence, CEO and board equity ownership, and 
ownership concentration) in modifying managerial risk-taking behavior in CEO duality leadership.  
 
THEORY AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES  
 
CEO Duality Leadership And Managerial Risk-Taking Behavior 
 
Risk is one of the key components in managerial decisions and has featured prominently in strategic 
management research (Ruefli, Collins, & Lacugna, 1999). Numerous researchers in the past have studied the 
determinants of risk behavior focusing on the dispositional characteristics of decision makers (e.g., Hambrick, Cho, 
& Chen, 1996) and the organizational and industrial  contexts affecting managerial risk-taking behavior (e.g., 
Palmer & Wiseman, 1999; Bromiley, 1991; Das & Teng, 2001). One other stream of research on risk uses agency 
theory as its theoretical framework. The underlying assumption is that principals are risk neutral while mangers 
(agents) tend to be risk averse.
1
  Prior risk literature based on agency theory suggests that the risk orientations of 
agents and principals are different (e.g., Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 1993). Management scholars supporting agency 
theory suggest that managers are risk-averse and shareholders are risk-neutral (Beatty & Zajac, 1994). In other 
words, if there is a good business opportunity potentially involving risk, principals expect managers to take the 
business opportunity and maximize their investment returns, while managers are hesitant to take the risky options 
because their returns and rewards (e.g., salary) from the risk-taking are limited. Moreover, managers are concerned 
more about downward risk such as dramatic decreases in firm performance and even firm bankruptcy, because 
managers‘ human capital is highly tied to the firm. In other words, they are more concerned about their employment 
risk and firm survival than profit maximization of shareholders (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Therefore, 
managers will place survival and stable income flow at a higher priority than firm profit maximization (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1989). On the other hand in the agent-shareholder relationship, shareholders or principals have risk 
neutral position regarding the firm‘s strategic choices, because investors can easily diversify their investment risk 
through the stock market, efficiently reducing their risk level (Beatty & Zajac, 1994). Thus, in order to align these 
differences, agency costs will have to be incurred. (e.g., Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991; Beatty & Zajac, 1994).  
 
Previous researchers in this research stream have provided empirical evidence supporting this argument of 
risk differentials between managers and investors in strategic management. Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) found 
that non-owner managerial behavior leads to increased levels of corporate diversification, particularly into unrelated 
industries to reduce managerial risk. Research focusing on firm R&D investment supports the argument that 
managers are more reluctant to R&D spending, because returns from R&D projects often requires considerable time 
and it involves uncertainty and risk (Hansen & Hill, 1991; Laverty, 1993). The R&D project is typically a long-term 
investment that involves substantial risk often with high failure rates (Ettlie, 1998). Managers are more likely to 
reduce R&D investment, particularly if it involves high risk and long-term periods in realizing the profits (Baysinger 
et al., 1991; Zahra, 1995; Kochhar & David, 1996). Proponents of agency theory also support this argument that 
managers or agents are more likely to under invest in R&D projects, because their objectives and interests are in 
securing their personal wealth and employment security (Baysinger et al., 1991; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Thus, 
we argue that power concentration on dual CEO and subsequent ineffective controlling functions from the board will 
reduce firm risk level, serving managerial risk preference. Their opportunistic risk aversion, combined with 
ineffective control from the board, may lead to decreased firm risk often to the detriment of shareholder‘s profit 
maximization. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 1: CEO duality will be negatively associated with firm risk-taking propensity. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998: 136) have provided helpful definitions concerning various organizational risk-taking 
behaviors. Risk aversion refers to the behavior ―preferring lower risk options at the expense of returns‖, risk neutral refers to 
―preferring options with the highest expected value and in which the risk is fully compensated‖, and risk seeking refers to 
―accepting options in which the risk is not fully compensated in hopes of realizing the up-side potential of the option‖. 
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Control Mechanisms In CEO Duality Structure 
 
To address the agency problem associated with different preferences for risk, a major challenge in corporate 
governance is to design supervisory and incentive mechanisms that can align the risk orientations of agents and 
principals (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Previous board researchers have 
addressed various control mechanisms that affect managerial risk-taking behavior, such as board independence, firm 
equity ownership and ownership structure (e.g., Baysinger et al., 1991; Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993; Beatty & Zajac, 
1994). Coles and Hesterly (2000: 200) state that ―leadership structure takes place within the context of other 
governance arrangements.‖ Managerial behavior drawn from one particular governance structure (e.g., CEO duality) 
would be an outcome of various interactions with other control mechanisms and organizational structure. Thus, we 
focus on governance control mechanisms that potentially interact with CEO duality leadership affecting managerial 
risk-taking behavior. 
 
CEO Equity Ownership 
 
Agency theorists suggest managerial equity ownership as a way to mitigate agency problems and align the 
managers‘ interests with those of the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theorists argue that CEO 
ownership would help to achieve alignment between the interests of the CEO (as an agent) and principals, because 
the value of CEO‘s equity holdings varies directly with the firm value and performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that substantial CEO ownership is one effective method of tying CEO wealth to 
shareholder wealth. Beatty and Zajac (1994) further argue that equity ownership by CEOs alters their risk 
preferences and makes it more closely matched to the interests of the principals. For example, Palmer and Wiseman 
(1999) observed that the stockholdings of top management had a positive impact on managerial risk taking. Bajaj, 
Chan, and Dasgupta (1998) suggest that in firms with little executive ownership, managers have incentive to 
underlever the firm to reduce bankruptcy risk. May (1995) also argues that CEOs with substantial shareholdings will 
exhibit more risk bearing behavior such as choosing riskier investment options. Thus, we predict that dual CEOs 
will be less risk-averse (i.e., becoming risk-neutral position in pursuing business opportunities) when they have 
higher equity ownership with the firm because their economic incentives are closely tied to the firm value and 
performance.   
 
Hypothesis 2: CEO equity ownership will moderate the negative relationship between CEO duality and firm risk-
taking propensity, with the relationship being weaker when the CEO has higher levels of equity 
ownership with the firm. 
 
Board Independence 
 
Monitoring mechanisms often involve the selection of socio-politically independent boards. Agency theory 
emphasizes the importance of board independence as a prerequisite for its effectiveness as a body exercising 
controlling and monitoring functions over management (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Agency 
theorists argue that without effective control systems, managers are likely to pursue opportunistic behavior to 
maximize their own utility rather than shareholder wealth maximization. For example, dominance of inside 
executives on the board may suggest that the board is less effective in controlling opportunistic CEO because they 
are hierarchically under influence of the CEO. Further, when the CEO is also the chairperson of the board, board‘s 
capacity to monitor the CEO is even further diminished. It has been argued that boards adopting CEO duality 
leadership are less likely to dissent and critically question boardroom strategic decisions (Mallette & Fowler, 1992). 
Thus, we argue that the concentration of power in the hands of the CEO and the resultant potential on the CEO‘s 
part to act opportunistically can be, at least, mitigated by the presence of directors who are independent of the CEO. 
Based on this reasoning, we propose board independence as a moderator of the relationship between CEO duality 
and firm risk-taking propensity. A board dominated by independent directors from the dual CEO will be more 
effective in controlling opportunistic managerial risk-taking behavior.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Board independence will moderate the negative relationship between CEO duality and firm risk-
taking propensity, with the relationship being weaker when the board is independent from the CEO. 
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Board Equity Ownership 
 
The incentive for monitoring is stronger when directors also have ownership equity in the firm (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  Equity ownership by directors makes their interests more aligned with those of the shareholders and causes 
them to be more effective in their monitoring function. Finkelstein and D‘Aveni (1994) suggest that vigilant boards 
are composed of independent outside directors with high equity ownership in the firm. Westphal and Zajac (1995) 
argue that director‘s equity ownership provides additional incentive to challenge CEOs‘ opportunistic initiatives. 
Several researchers in the past have empirically examined the effects of board equity ownership on the effectiveness 
of board‘s monitoring and controlling functions (e.g., Finkelstein, 1992; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). For example, Li 
and Simerly (1998) found that equity ownership by directors encourages them to pursue more long-term 
performance, which serves principal‘s utility functions. Thus, directors‘ economic motives in controlling 
management opportunism are reflected in the hypothesis arguing that equity ownership by the directors encourage 
them to be more active in monitoring and controlling management,  constraining managerial risk-averse behavior in 
strategic management.    
 
Hypothesis 4: Board equity ownership will moderate the negative relationship between CEO duality and firm risk-
taking propensity, with the relationship being weaker when the board has higher levels of equity 
ownership with the firm. 
 
Ownership Concentration 
 
Board researchers have suggested that ownership structure has substantial impact on managerial behavior 
(e.g., Wright, Ferris, Sarin, & Awasthi, 1996; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002). Ownership is a source 
of power in governance control. It also provides economic incentive to more effectively monitor and control the 
managerial strategic initiatives. In this regard, it has been argued that if the firm ownership structure is highly 
dispersed, then monitoring and controlling functions would be less effective (Hoskisson et al., 2002). An empirical 
research provides evidence that firms with highly dispersed ownership may pursue excessive corporate 
diversification because monitoring cannot be effectively pursued by dispersed owners (Hoskisson & Turk, 1990). 
Other researchers in the past found that there is a negative relationship between ownership concentration and firm‘s 
diversification level, suggesting that ownership is related to active monitoring of agent managers (Lloyd, Hand, & 
Modani, 1987). Regarding the effect of institutional owners on the board, representation of large block holders on 
the board has a positive impact on increasing the firm‘s risk-taking propensity (Pennings, 1980; Stearns & Mizruchi, 
1993). These previous studies suggest that concentrated ownership increases board‘s power and provides an 
incentive for a more effective monitoring and controlling on managerial opportunistic initiatives. Thus we predict:  
 
Hypothesis 5: Ownership concentration will moderate the negative relationship between CEO duality and firm risk-
taking propensity, with the relationship being weaker when the distribution of ownership in the firm 
is concentrated. 
  
METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample 
 
To test the hypotheses, a data setting of Fortune 1000 firms for the year of 2002 was elected. Since one of 
the study objectives is to reduce theoretical and empirical ambiguity surrounding CEO duality leadership, 
generalizability of study results would be an important criterion in methodological aspects (i.e., research results 
should not be from a specific industry condition and governance structure). In this regard, Fortune 1000 firms 
provide an appropriate setting for increasing the potential generalizability of results based on the sample, since these 
firms encompass a variety of business strategies, industries, and governance structures. Given the fact that about 75 
to 80 percent of large U.S. firms adopt CEO duality leadership (Brickley et al., 1997), a stratified random sampling 
was used based on the criterion of CEO duality versus non-CEO duality. Thus, in total, 290 firms were randomly 
selected consisting of 145 CEO duality and 145 non-CEO duality firms.  
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Measures 
 
CEO Duality 
 
CEO duality is coded as 1 if an individual simultaneously serves as both CEO and chairperson of the board 
and ‗0‘ otherwise. A recent study conducted by Coles and Hesterly (2000) elaborated CEO duality measure in which 
dual CEOs who have previous affiliations with the firm are categorized as non-CEO duality firm. Although their 
measure enhances conceptual precision in measuring the concept of CEO duality, we believe that it can involve 
subjectivity in categorization. We argue that in real selection practice, there will few new CEOs and board 
chairpersons who are totally independent and objective to the organization because they are directly and indirectly 
tied to the company through various social networks. Thus, we relied on formal hierarchical structure. By employing 
this measure, we more focus on the structural impact of CEO duality on managerial behavior regarding firm risk. 
The data were obtained from the firm‘s proxy statements. 
 
Firm Risk 
 
One of the major issues in research on firm risk-taking has been the measurement of firm risk (Fiegenbaum 
& Thomas, 1986; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Baird and Thomas (1990) examined how risk has been 
conceptualized in different disciplines of management, finance, marketing and psychology, and found various 
conceptualizations of risk. They observed that researchers in the area of strategic management typically defined risk 
as unpredictability of business outcome variables (e.g., variability of accounting or stock returns). Miller and 
Bromiley (1990) suggest that measures employed in the study of firm risk may reflect different dimensions of risk. 
They identified three dimensions based on a factor analysis of nine measures of risk: income stream risk (variation 
in returns over time), strategic risk (primarily debt ratio), and stock returns risk (beta). A more recent research 
reviewing risk studies published from 1980 through 1995 showed that beta from the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) and income variance are the two most widely used measures of firm risk in strategic management literature 
(Ruefli et al., 1999). In this study we employed income stream risk for the measure of firm risk because managerial 
risk-taking behavior can be best reflected in firm‘s income stream variance. An empirical study testing the 
association between managerial risk taking and organizational risk also provide a direct positive relationship 
between the two (Palmer & Wiseman, 1999). We measured the income stream risk as the standard deviation of ROA 
(e.g., Bettis & Mahajan, 1985; Cool, Dierickx, & Jemison, 1989). Financial data were available from Compustat. 
 
Board Composition 
 
Previous board researchers have suggested various conceptualizations and operationalizations of board 
independence, including inside director proportion (e.g., Cochran, Wood, & Jones, 1985), outside director 
proportion (e.g., Dalton & Kesner, 1987), affiliated director proportion (Daily & Dalton, 1994), and independent/ 
interdependent distinction (e.g., Boeker, 1992; Daily, 1995; Wade, O‘Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990).  Following 
Boeker (1992), this study employs the independence-interdependence measure because it provides a fair reflection 
of the socio-political aspects in CEO-board relations. This measure defines independent directors as outside board 
members who are appointed prior to the current CEO. In this measure, directors who were appointed to the board 
prior to the current CEO are regarded as relatively more independent from the CEO than the directors who were 
appointed during the current CEO‘s tenure. CEO and director equity ownership was measured as the percentage of 
total common equity owned by CEO and the directors respectively (Finkelstein, 1992). The data for board 
independence and equity ownership by directors and CEO were available on corporate proxy statements (e.g., 10-K 
and 14 Def.) filed with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). 
 
Ownership Concentration 
 
Ownership concentration was measured as the concentration of institutional investors‘ ownership (Hartzell 
& Starks, 2003). We employed the Herfindahl Index for calculating the institutional investor ownership 
concentration ratio accounted for by the top five institutional investors in a firm. Larger values in the Herfindahl 
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index indicate a more concentrated ownership structure in a firm. Data on institutional equity holdings were 
available from the Mergent database.  
 
Control Variables 
 
This research also controlled for several factors that have been shown in past research to be associated with 
firm risk. Zahra and Pearce (1989) suggest that greater scale of the firm may increase the amount of uncertainty and 
complexity in the firm‘s operation. Thus, previous empirical studies have suggested a positive relationship between 
firm size and firm risk (Graves, 1988; Hansen & Hill, 1991). We, therefore, controlled for firm size which was 
measured as the firm revenue for the three year of 2002. We also controlled for past firm performance. Prospect 
theory (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) suggests that a firm with performance above industry average (i.e., 
reference point) is likely to be risk-averse and would assume less risky options. Empirical findings also support the 
argument that low performance leads to greater risk propensity and high performers are often less inclined to take 
risks (e.g., Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996). Past firm performance is calculated by averaging the return on assets 
(ROA) for the three-year period from 1999 to 2001. This study also controlled for board size. From a group 
dynamics perspective, larger board may suffer from diffusion of responsibility (Janis, 1989) and decreased levels of 
motivation in monitoring and controlling management (Jewell & Reitz, 1981). Board size is measured as the number 
of directors on the board. 
 
In addition, given that past research has associated industry conditions with firm risk (e.g., Reed & Luffman, 
1986; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1986), we controlled for industry profitability. Industry profitability is measured as 
average percentage change in profit for all firms included in the sample for the period from 1999 to 2001. 
Calculation of average industry profitability is based on the two-digit SIC code. Financial data were obtained from 
the S&P Compustat database. We also included a dummy variable of manufacturing industry (manufacturing 
industry = 1 and ‗0‘ otherwise) to control for industry types. Firms at SIC code 2000 and 3000 levels are classified 
as manufacturing firms. In the past, strategy researchers focusing on agency theory have argued that opportunistic 
managers may diversify their business domains into unrelated industries to stabilize corporate income flows and to 
further reduce managerial risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). That is, firm risk reduction is 
obtained through combining business lines with less correlated business cycles and financial flows. Thus, this study 
controlled for corporation‘s level of unrelated diversification. We used Jacquemin and Berry‘s (1979) entropy 
measure. The level of unrelated diversification is measured by the degree to which a firm‘s sales are allocated across 
unrelated (different two-digit SIC codes) industry segments. The sales data for the business lines were obtained from 
the S&P Compustat database. We also controlled for CEO tenure. Previous researchers finds that CEOs tend to make 
fewer strategic changes as their tenure increases (Grimm & Smith, 1991; Hambrick et al., 1996) leading to more 
risk-averse behavior in firm strategic management. We measured the CEO tenure as the number of months the CEO 
has served in the firm (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). 
 
Statistical Analysis 
 
We conducted moderated hierarchical regression analyses to test main and interactive effects of CEO 
duality on firm risk-taking propensity (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Following the procedure 
provided by Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie (1981), seven control variables included in this study were entered in the 
first hierarchical step. After entering the control variables, we entered CEO duality in the second step to examine the 
relative direct contribution of CEO duality. In the third step, moderating variables of CEO equity ownership, board 
independence, board equity ownership, and ownership concentration then entered. Finally, the two-way interaction 
terms representing moderators were entered. The significance of coefficients and incremental variances explained by 
the variables were examined for testing the significance. 
 
RESULTS 
 
The means, standard deviations, and correlations for the sample are presented in Table 2. The sample firms 
encompass a variety of industries and 195 firms out of 290 firms were in manufacturing industry. Sample firms in 
average have 10.9 directors in their board. Descriptive statistics show that 47.3 percent of directors in the sample 
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firms were independent in terms of the measure used (s.d.=.29). There was no significant difference between duality 
and non-duality firms in terms of board independence. CEOs on average have 1.5 percent of the equity ownership 
and directors (excluding the ownership by CEO) held about 6.8 percent ownership, but there was large variation in 
the ownership data (s.d. = .04; s.d. = .20 respectively). In the simple T-test, boards in non-duality firms had 
significantly higher ownership equity than the boards in duality firms at the .05 level. CEOs in the CEO duality 
firms have significantly longer tenure than the CEOs in nonduality firm (p<.05). However, there was no significant 
difference in CEO ownership between duality versus non-duality firms. As the ownership data was positively 
skewed, we applied a natural logarithm on these variables of CEO and board equity ownership. We also applied a 
log transformation for the variable of firm size and ownership concentration because of the positive skewness in 
these data. In regards to firm diversification, CEO duality firms show significantly higher levels of unrelated 
diversification than non-duality firms (p<.05). In the statistical tests involving interaction terms (regression model 4 
in Table 3), there was concern for multicollinearity when the interaction term between CEO duality and board 
independence was included in the model, thus scale transformation (mean deviates) was applied on the variable of 
board independence when we test the moderating effects (Variance Inflation Factor was less than 2.31 after the 
rescaling). Aiken and West (1991: 29) suggest that rescaling methods do not affect the significance of coefficients 
for the highest order term (interaction term in the model 4) in regression analysis. 
 
Table 3 reports the results of the hierarchical regression analysis. Hypothesis 1 predicts that CEO duality 
will be negatively associated with firm risk level measured as income stream risk. Test results of hypothesis 1 
provide empirical evidence that firms adopting CEO duality leadership show significantly lower levels of firm risk 
(-1.11; p<.05, model 2). The result is consistent with the agency theory perspective that power concentration on dual 
CEO and resultant weak board leads to lower risk-taking propensity in the firm.  
 
Hypotheses 2 through 5 focus on moderating roles of governance mechanisms in the relationship between 
CEO duality and firm risk-taking behavior. Hypothesis 2 suggests a moderating effect of CEO equity ownership in 
the relationship between CEO duality and firm risk-taking behavior, arguing that higher CEO equity ownership will 
positively moderate the negative relationship between CEO duality and firm risk. There was no significant 
moderating effect for the CEO equity ownership in controlling managerial risk-taking behavior. Hypothesis 3 
predicted that board independence would moderate the relationship between CEO duality and firm risk-taking 
behavior. That is, when the board is characterized by higher levels of independence, this will reduce managerial 
opportunism regarding firm risk. The results show no evidence of significant moderating effect of board 
independence on the relationship between CEO duality and firm risk, providing no evidence for agency argument 
regarding the role of board independence. Hypothesis 4 predicted a moderating effect of board equity ownership in 
the relationship between CEO duality and firm risk suggesting that when the board has lower levels of equity 
ownership with the firm, CEO duality leadership will be more negatively related to firm risk-taking behavior. There 
was no significant moderating effect of board equity ownership. Thus, hypothesis 4 developed based on agency 
perspective regarding agent equity ownership was also not supported. 
 
Hypotheses 5 suggest a moderating effect of ownership concentration in the relationship between CEO 
duality and firm risk-taking behavior. We predicted that as the distribution of ownership in the firm becomes more 
concentrated, monitoring and controlling functions over the management will be more actively conducted, thus 
reducing managerial risk-averse behavior in strategic management. The test results of hypothesis 5 provide 
empirical evidence supporting the argument. There was a significant positive interaction effect between CEO duality 
and ownership concentration (45.14; p<.05; model 4; VIF<2.0). CEO duality leadership under the control of large 
institutional stock holders on the board shows higher levels of firm risk-taking. The results suggest that large block 
holders on the board have substantial role in modifying managerial risk-taking behavior.  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – First Quarter 2008 Volume 24, Number 1 
35 
Table 2 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix2 
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5  6  7  8  9 10 11 12 
1. Duality .50 .50    
 
        
 
 
 
 
2. Income Stream Risk  3.72 4.26 -.20**             
3. CEO Equity 
Ownership  
.02 .04 -.03 -.04            
4. Board Independence  .47 .29 -.09 .04 -.16**           
5. Board Equity 
Ownership 
.07 .20 -.16** .09 .13* .04           
6. Ownership 
Concentration 
-4.64 2.04 -.05 -.19** -.03 .10 -.17 **         
7. Firm Size 13.08 21.98 .24*** -.14* -.05 .01 -.10  -.06        
8. Past Firm 
Performance 
4.29 5.54 .11 -.41*** .04 -.10 -.16 ** .15 * .03      
9. Board Size 10.94 2.71 .17** -.18** .00 .09 -.05  -.04  .30 *** .03    
10. Industry 
Profitability 
-.01 .20 -.06 -.05 .07 -.01 .08  .02  .02  .23 *** -.10   
11. Manufacturing 
Industry 
.67 .47 .07 .17** -.07 .03 -.04  -.09  -.11  .03  -.05 -.08   
12. Unrelated 
Diversification 
.22 .29 .18** -.01 -.06 .12 -.11  -.09  .22 *** -.01  .12* -.00 .15*  
13. CEO Tenure 66.44 69.65 .23*** -.10 .22*** -.60*** -.10  .03  .10  .17 ** .11 .03 -.03 -.04 
 * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
                                                 
2
 n = 290 
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Table 3 
Regression Models: CEO Duality and Firm Risk3 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Constant) 
9.98 
(1.98) 
*** 8.36 
(2.10) 
*** 7.01 
(2.21) 
** 6.56 
(2.28) 
** 
Firm Size  
-.47 
(.24) 
* -.24 
(.26) 
 -.33 
(.27) 
 -.31 
(.27) 
 
Past Firm Performance  
-.31 
(.04) 
*** -.30 
(.04) 
*** -.29 
(.04) 
*** -.29 
(.04) 
*** 
Board Size 
-.16 
(.09) 
† -.17 
(.09) 
† -.20 
(.09) 
* -.18 
(.10) 
† 
Industry Profitability 
1.73 
(1.19) 
 1.65 
(1.18) 
 1.50 
(1.20) 
 1.30 
(1.21) 
 
Manufacturing Industry 
1.32 
(.50) 
** 1.49 
(.50) 
** 1.31 
(.52) 
* 1.33 
(.52) 
** 
Unrelated Diversification 
.02 
(.81) 
 .13 
(.80) 
 .07 
(.80) 
 .06 
(.81) 
 
CEO Tenure 
.00 
(.00) 
 .00 
(.00) 
 .00 
(.00) 
 .00 
(.00) 
 
         
CEO Duality   
-1.11 
(.52) 
* -1.08 
(.54) 
* -1.91 
(.74) 
* 
         
CEO Equity Ownership     
-.24 
(.18) 
 -.24 
(.19) 
 
Board Independence     
.19 
(1.00) 
 -.60 
(1.22) 
 
Board Equity Ownership     
.05 
(.12) 
 .05 
(.14) 
 
Ownership Concentration     
-.25 
(.11) 
* -.35 
(.12) 
** 
         
CEO Duality  CEO Equity Ownership         
2.13 
(9.12) 
 
CEO Duality  Board Independence        
1.63 
(1.61) 
 
CEO Duality  Board Equity Ownership        
-1.07 
(2.60) 
 
CEO Duality  Ownership Concentration       
45.14 
(22.82) 
* 
         
R-Squared .23  .25  .26     .28  
Change in R-Squared .23  .01   .02  .01  
F-test 11.87 *** 11.11 *** 8.04 *** 6.37 *** 
F-test for change in F-value 11.87 *** 4.64 * 1.68  1.29  
 † ≤ .10; * p ≤.05; ** p ≤.01; *** p ≤.001 
 
 
The control variables of firm size, past firm performance, board size, and manufacturing industry included 
in this study had significant effects on firm risk. Increases in firm size and firm performance led to lower levels of 
firm risk (p<.05 and p<.01, respectively). Board size is negatively related to firm risk (p<.10). Firms in 
                                                 
3 Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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manufacturing industries had higher levels of income stream variance (p<.01). Diversification into unrelated 
industries had no significant impact on reducing firm risk. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Given the theoretical and empirical ambiguity surrounding CEO duality leadership, the results of this study 
examining the intermediate outcomes of firm risk-taking propensity provides clearer implications about the 
desirability of CEO duality leadership often adopted by large U.S. corporations. We expect the study findings to 
have important implications for both governance researchers and practitioners. From the viewpoint of scholars 
interested in corporate governance the findings of this study should provide insights on how the governance 
structure (CEO duality) impacts the firm strategic behavior, specifically with regard to the firm risk. From a 
managerial standpoint, the results should also provide guidelines on the desirability of duality and also on whether 
governance mechanisms help mitigates the potential agency problems associated with CEO duality leadership.  
 
We provide empirical evidence regarding how combined leadership structure affects managerial behavior 
regarding firm risk which is an important element in corporate strategic management and shareholder‘s investment 
utility maximization. The empirical examination of 290 large U.S. corporations provides evidence supporting 
agency perspective that combined leadership structure facilitates managerial opportunism that firms with CEO 
duality structure had significantly lower levels of firm risk-taking propensity, which serves managerial risk 
preferences. The results imply that CEO duality structure intensifies the issue of power concentration on CEO and 
weakens the board‘s effectiveness in monitoring and controlling management. Thus, the findings of this study 
highlight the issue of power concentration on CEO and subsequent impacts on managerial firm behavior in strategic 
management. The results of this study support the argument that power concentration in joint leadership structure 
facilitates managerial opportunism in corporate strategic management. That is, CEO duality structure provides less 
effective checks and balance mechanism in controlling managerial opportunism.  
 
We also argue that the findings in this study are consistent with recent theoretical and empirical 
prescriptions on CEO duality leadership. For example, Pollock, Fischer, and Wade (2002) observed that CEO duality 
resulted in increased likelihood of executive options being repriced - an action generally found objectionable by 
shareholders. A more recent study found that there was more occurrence of earnings management (i.e., manager‘s 
impression management through use of flexible accounting principles to distort actual earnings) when the firm had 
CEO duality leadership, suggesting ineffective monitoring functions in the firm (Davidson, Jiraporn, Kim, & 
Nemec, 2004). A study examining the impact of CEO duality on the reorganization process of firms in bankruptcy 
filing found that dual CEOs delay the approval of reorganization plans to increase their power and facilitate CEO 
entrenchment in the firm (Brockmann et al., 2004). These empirical findings together with the results of this 
research suggest various adverse effects associated with CEO duality leadership. As previous board researchers have 
emphasized the balance of power among governance entities (i.e., relative power of board to incumbent CEO and 
vice versa) (e.g., Finkelstein & D‘Aveni, 1994; Shen & Cannella, 2002; Westphal & Zajac, 1995), we argue that 
power concentration on dual CEO increases the chance of managerial opportunism in firm management.  
 
For richer insights about the relationship between CEO duality structure and firm risk-taking behavior, 
several elements were incorporated into the empirical model that have been highly researched in previous studies in 
corporate governance. These are the governance mechanisms of CEO and board equity ownership, board 
independence, and ownership concentration. We included these moderating variables to reflect both socio-political 
and economic aspects in agent-principal relationship. The results of this study suggest that these control mechanisms 
have little impact in controlling managerial behavior in CEO duality firms, providing little empirical evidence 
regarding the role of these governance mechanisms. However, we find a significant impact of ownership structure 
on controlling managerial behavior in CEO duality leadership. We found empirical evidence that concentration of 
stock ownership in the firm does have substantial influence on managerial behavior. The results provide evidence 
that ownership concentration interacts with CEO duality leadership and modifies managerial behavior regarding 
firm risk, resulting in increases in firm risk. That is, dual CEOs perceive powerful control from large block holders 
in the firm. Dual CEOs perceive voting power of block holders that has substantial impact on their employment 
security and their leadership. This suggests that the issue of power concentration in CEO duality leadership is 
mitigated and/or balanced by powerful block holders in the firm. Given the findings of this research, investors and 
stakeholders might be well advised to consider the importance of power balance in CEO-board relations for 
designing effective control mechanisms in corporate governance. 
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Interestingly, ownership concentration itself had a negative effect on firm risk, (-.25; p<.05; Table 3, model 
3). That is, although CEO duality and ownership concentration individually had a negative impact on firm risk, 
interaction between two entities leads to higher firm risk taking.  Our interpretation is that a powerful board (i.e., 
large block holders on the board) induces defensive behavior from the CEO and executives resulting in lower firm 
risk levels. However, when dual CEO and block holders on the board interact at the corporate top, they pursue 
riskier business opportunities and options for higher investment returns and firm performance, resulting in higher 
firm risk levels. The results emphasize the importance of interactions and behavioral dynamics among governance 
entities in revealing the role of control mechanisms in corporate governance.  
 
As a concluding remark, we also note a caution for readers in interpreting the study results. Given the 
equivocal empirical evidence regarding the relationship between firm risk and performance (Miller & Bromiley, 
1990), prescriptive argument based on the results of this study is limited to the extent of predicting managerial 
behavior in strategic management, not to the extent of performance prediction on CEO duality leadership. Secondly, 
this research focuses on association between CEO duality and firm risk in a research setting that encompasses 
diverse industry environments and governance structures. Thus, inference about causal relationship between the two 
is limited. That is, firm risk may influence the adoption of CEO duality leadership rather than the opposite. Future 
governance researchers may further clarify the causal relationship by employing different research settings such as 
longitudinal research model. 
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